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When you read the title of this paper, what 
likely comes to mind is images of Koala 
bears being rescued from bush fires, or of 
injured raccoons and deer, being rehabili-
tated after a hurricane. These are examples 
of humanitarian assistance for wild animals, 
but they’re not what this paper is primar-
ily about. The need for humanitarian as-
sistance in the wild far exceeds the damage 
caused by natural disasters. Severe suffering 
is pervasive in nature. It’s built into natural 
processes, and thus it’s the norm rather than 
the exception.  
Many people think that evolution is an 
inherently beneficial process: that the traits 
it produces evolved because they benefit the 
animals who have them. This is a miscon-
ception, though. Evolution selects traits that 
protect an animal’s genes, and protecting an 
animal’s genes is different from benefitting 
her. Richard Dawkins provides some good 
examples in his book River Out of Eden: male 
peacocks are encumbered by heavy feathers; 
and male songbirds exert considerable en-
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ergy, and attract the attention of predators, 
by singing for prolonged periods of time. 
Being encumbered isn’t good for peacocks, 
and exposing themselves to danger isn’t 
good for songbirds. Rather, the function of 
heavy feathers and prolonged singing, is to 
protect the birds’ genes by attracting mates. 
Mating, and reproducing, may be enjoy-
able for these animals, but surely evolution 
would have facilitated these goals some oth-
er way if the purpose of evolved traits were 
to benefit the animals who have them.   
Since the purpose of evolution is to 
protect genes, you’d think that a parent’s 
evolved traits at least function to benefit 
her children. Unfortunately, protecting an 
animals’ genes doesn’t always benefit her 
children either. After all, many animals 
are r-strategists: they protect their genes 
by producing large numbers of offspring. 
Some r-strategist parents (such as certain 
rodents) produce dozens of offspring per 
litter or clutch, while others (such as cer-
tain fish) produce thousands or even mil-
lions. Unlike K-strategists, who have few 
offspring but devote a lot of energy to each 
of them, r-strategists play a numbers game. 
Though the majority of their offspring die 
painfully and prematurely, parents produce 
enough to ensure that some will survive to 
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maturity and successfully reproduce. In oth-
er words, the r-strategy protects a parent’s 
genes, but it sacrifices most of her offspring 
in the process.     
It’s worth pausing to think about the 
r-strategy’s implications for wild animals’ 
quality of life. First, it’s clear that most 
r-strategists live bad lives. Their lives are 
typically short, and they typically die from 
painful causes such as predation, starvation, 
exposure, or dehydration. What’s more, the 
fact that infant r-strategists are at a high risk 
of dying from painful causes suggests that 
their short lives are characterised by hard-
ships, e.g., by inadequate access to food, by 
the threat of predators, etc. Only a lucky 
few eventually learn to manage the dangers 
of life and become comfortable in their en-
vironment. Were the r-strategy very rare 
among wild animal species, its implications 
might not be too dramatic. Unfortunately, 
it’s prevalent among many species of ani-
mal, such as fish, lizards, amphibians, and 
small mammals. There are many K-strate-
gist species too, of course, but the fact that 
r-strategists have far higher birth rates than 
K-strategists, means that far more individ-
ual r-strategists are born into the world 
than individual K-strategists. Given how 
numerous r-strategists are, ethicists such 
as Catia Faria, Oscar Horta, Eze Paez, and 
Brian Tomasik conclude that the amount 
of suffering in nature probably exceeds the 
amount of enjoyment in it. They may or 
may not be right about that, but at the very 
least we can say that most individual wild 
animals live bad lives.  
It might be objected that most r-strate-
gists aren’t sentient: that they’re incapable 
of having experiences such as pleasure or 
pain. Indeed, many r-strategists are insects, 
and it’s uncertain whether insects are sen-
tient.  However, it’s important to keep in 
mind that the r-strategy isn’t just common 
among insects. It’s common across many 
species of animal, including animals we 
know are sentient, such as mammals (small 
mammals are often r-strategists). Though it 
may turn out to be false that most r-strate-
gists are sentient, it remains true that most 
sentient individuals born into the world 
are r-strategists. This follows from the fact 
that sentient r-strategists’ birth rates are so 
much higher than sentient K-strategists’.  
Though animals who survive to maturi-
ty normally live better lives than those who 
don’t, it would be hasty to conclude that 
their lives are easy. Mature wild animals are 
subject to hardships far worse than anything 
most human beings deal with (especially 
humans living in wealthy countries). Exam-
ples include disease, parasites, predator-in-
duced stress, predator-caused injuries, and 
extreme temperatures.     
Since wild animals are so numerous, and 
live such difficult lives, the scale of wild an-
imal suffering is far higher than anything 
we’re used to. Consider two well-known, 
large-scale problems: global poverty and 
factory farming. According to The World 
Bank, 689 million human beings were liv-
ing on less than $1.90 per day in 2017. And 
according to a recent estimate in Christo-
pher Schlottmann’s and Jeff Sebo’s Food, 
Animals, and the Environment, 70 billion 
terrestrial animals are killed every year 
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vores, or r-strategists into K-strategists. 
Though I think ecosystems populated by 
K-strategist herbivores would be far better 
for wild animals than our current ecosys-
tems are, we should only bring such eco-
systems about if, and when, it’s feasible and 
safe to do so. Furthermore, it may turn out 
that it often isn’t, and never could be, feasi-
ble or safe to bring them about. Put another 
way, ecosystems populated by K-strategist 
herbivores are ideal for animals, but at the 
present moment, it’s hard to say whether 
that ideal could one day be achieved. 
One promising type of large-scale inter-
vention, is to give wild animals a “genetic 
painkiller”. In other words, we could use 
gene-editing to reduce the extent to which 
animals’ pain bothers them (much the way 
we use medication to dull our own pain). 
This might sound like science fiction, but 
it isn’t. Gene-editing has already been used 
to produce mice who have a dulled capacity 
for pain, and the Sculpting Evolution group 
at the MIT Media Lab is currently work-
ing to produce more. What’s more, current 
gene-editing technology is capable of driv-
ing traits through populations, i.e., it can be 
used to ensure that when an edited animal 
mates with a wild animal, nearly all of the ed-
ited animal’s offspring will inherit the engi-
neered trait, that nearly all of her offspring’s 
offspring will inherit the engineered trait, 
etc. Though it would be foolish to com-
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(mostly in factory farms). As large as these 
numbers are, though, wild animals are far 
more numerous. For example, the number 
of sentient r-strategist infants who perish 
over, say, a 5-year period, may very well be 
somewhere in the quadrillions (or higher).  
Despite its scale, wild animal suffering 
is also neglected. Relative to global pov-
erty and factory farming, very few people 
are working on ways to assist wild animals. 
As a result, wild animal suffering presents 
a tremendous opportunity for philanthro-
py. Effective interventions would do a tre-
mendous amount of good, and the fact that 
relatively few people are working on the 
problem suggests that many potential inter-
ventions are still waiting to be discovered. 
Thankfully, some organisations are current-
ly working on wild animal suffering, e.g., 
Animal Ethics, Wild Animal Initiative, and 
Rethink Priorities.  
  You may be surprised to learn that some 
beneficial interventions are already being 
performed on a regular basis. It’s standard 
in many countries to vaccinate wild animal 
populations against diseases that threaten 
either domesticated animals or human be-
ings, e.g., rabies. These vaccinations aren’t 
provided for wild animals’ sake, but they do 
foreseeably benefit the wild animals who 
receive them. One straightforward possi-
bility, then, is to just increase the number 
of wild animal vaccination programs, and to 
vaccinate wild animals against diseases even 
when those diseases don’t threaten us.  
Restricting ourselves to familiar, rela-
tively small-scale (but still important) in-
terventions isn’t very satisfying, though. 
Perhaps we should go further? We could, 
for example, research genetic interventions 
intended to change carnivores into herbi-
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pletely deprive animals of their capacity for 
pain, a genetic painkiller wouldn’t do that. 
It would just reduce the extent to which 
an animal’s pain bothers her, thus leaving 
intact her ability to avoid harmful stimuli. 
Nor would it be necessary to permanently 
dull animals’ capacity for pain. We could 
presumably limit the period of time during 
which an animal’s capacity is affected, e.g., 
we could relieve r-strategist infants’ pain 
during the period of time they’re most like-
ly to die a painful death, after which their 
full capacity for pain would return (much 
the way pain-killing medication works). 
Interventions like this shouldn’t take long 
to develop, since we’ve already managed 
to create a genetic painkiller for mice, and 
implementing them shouldn’t have a sig-
nificant impact on animals’ population sizes 
or on the way ecosystems function. What 
they would significantly impact, though, is 
wild animals’ wellbeing. Since the benefits 
promise to be astronomically large, and 
the harms quite small, the main challenge 
is mustering the political will needed to de-
velop, and administer, genetic painkillers to 
wild animals.   
It might be objected that intervening 
in nature reduces its naturalness, and that 
naturalness ought to be preserved. Howev-
er, I don’t think it’s plausible to claim that 
naturalness has any value independent of 
animals’, and humans’, wellbeing. When 
interfering with nature improves our own 
wellbeing, we don’t hesitate to do it, e.g., 
we protect ourselves from bad weather, cure 
ourselves of diseases, etc. And though inter-
vening in nature carries certain risks, the 
right response is to proceed with caution. 
If we have good reason to believe that an 
intervention will provide significant bene-
fits, and good reason to believe that it’s safe, 
then we have good reason to implement it.   
A second objection is that intervening in 
nature is too paternalistic, i.e., that trying 
to help wild animals requires unjustified, 
coercive interference with their lives. I have 
a couple of points to make in reply. First, 
many interventions do not interfere with 
wild animals’ liberties. For example, using 
feeding stations to vaccinate wild animals 
does not involve any coercion at all. Since 
paternalistic interventions are, by defini-
tion, coercive, interventions that don’t use 
coercion can’t be paternalistic.  
Gene-editing, by contrast, does involve 
some coercion: it requires infringing the 
liberties of animals who are used in exper-
iments. However, the animals who stand to 
benefit from these experiments do not have 
to be coerced in any way. Engineered traits 
are passed on to future animals by releas-
ing edited animals into the wild. Neither 
the wild animals who mate with them, nor 
the generations of offspring that follow, are 
coerced. However, even if it was true that 
such interventions are, in some sense, pater-
nalistic, it isn’t clear that this is a problem. 
Paternalistic interference is only inappro-
priate when a being is competent to man-
age the dangers she’s being protected from. 
Since most wild animals die during infancy 
from the various dangers they’re exposed 
to, it’s false that they competently manage 
those dangers. Though it’s true that certain 
wild animal species are competent (those that 
So, what should we 
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manage to stave off extinction), the vast ma-
jority of wild animal individuals are not, and 
never become, competent. 
A third objection is that some interven-
tions, namely those involving gene-editing, 
require that we first perform unjustified ex-
periments on animals. Genetic experiments 
require that we restrict animals’ liberties, 
they’re often painful, and they can have 
unintended consequences that negative-
ly impact edited animals’ health. Though 
these are significant harms, a few things 
about them should be kept in mind. First, 
some interventions shouldn’t require much 
testing to develop. As I mentioned above, 
we’ve already managed to create a genet-
ic painkiller for mice, so we won’t need to 
start from scratch when developing similar 
painkillers for use in the wild. Second, the 
harms of genetic experimentation, though 
significant, only affect a small portion of the 
targeted populations. As I mentioned above, 
engineered traits are driven through popu-
lations when edited animals reproduce with 
wild animals. The generations of offspring 
who inherit the engineered traits would 
never see the inside of a laboratory, and 
they would vastly outnumber the animals 
experimented upon. Though we should be 
reluctant to benefit some when we must 
harm others in the process, we should also 
make exceptions when the stakes are high 
enough. Since the benefits of administering 
genetic painkillers to r-strategists would be 
astronomically high, the harms of experi-
mentation are justified. That said, it might 
be best to wait until there’s sufficient pub-
lic support. It would be wrong to perform 
experiments unless we have good reason to 
believe that the interventions under devel-
opment will actually be implemented.   
So, what should we do right now? What 
are the implications of wild animal suffer-
ing for animal activism? Though it might be 
tempting to advocate for genetic editing, I 
think it’s best to hold off for now. Philoso-
phers and animal studies scholars are some-
times willing to entertain the idea that we 
should genetically edit wild animal popula-
tions, but I don’t think the general public 
will take such proposals seriously (yet). A 
better strategy is to focus on raising aware-
ness about the full extent of wild animal 
suffering, and on investigating and building 
support for comparatively modest interven-
tions, such as wild animal vaccination pro-
grams. Once there’s sufficient awareness 
about wild animal suffering, and sufficient 
support for a range of modest interventions, 
building support for more ambitious initia-
tives will be easier. In addition, traditional 
animal activism has a helpful role to play, 
e.g., advocating for veganism and for the 
view that animals matter just as much as we 
do. People who see animals as our moral 
equals, and who’ve gone vegan out of re-
spect for animals’ moral importance, are far 
more likely to care about wild animal suf-
fering when made aware of it. Moral prog-
ress can be slow, so there’s no time like the 
present to start.
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